The Israeli Strategy and the Palestinian Response          Â
The Israeli-Palestinian track of the Middle East peace process deadlocked
recently. The immediate causes were
the insistence of the Israeli side to act unilaterally - without agreement or
negotiations with the Palestinian side – regarding the 3rd stage of
redeployment from 6.1% of the West Bank, as well as the Israeli attempt to
escape the 3rd phase of redeployment and its attempts to evade the
time limits set for the framework agreement and beyond.           Â
These immediate causes are reflective of the broader strategy of the
current Israeli government. In this
respect, despite the soft approach of this government, its strategy does not
differ much from the same broad strategy pursued by previous governments.Â
This should not be understood as an attempt to equate Barak with
Netanyahu, as the latter could not be trusted by any party.Â
However, when it comes to substance in the peace process, the strategy is
very much the same. This is
characterized by the following: non-compliance with the existing agreements and
undermining the basis of the peace process in an attempt to achieve Israeli
expansion beyond the armistice lines and, in service of this, the continuation
of illegal Israeli actions such as settlements and actions in Jerusalem, aimed
at imposing a fait accompli.           Â
The present Israeli government, for instance, is trying to evade
implementation of many provisions of the existing agreements, including the
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. Another
tactic has been the Israeli attempt to give those provisions totally illogical
interpretations and then unilaterally impose them, as it has precisely done with
regard to both the 3rd stage of the redeployment and the 3rd
phase under the absurd guise of combining it with final settlement negotiations. The
Israeli government is also consistently trying to evade the agreed time limit.Â
First through postponing the time limit of the framework agreement and
then using that to destroy the agreed upon overall time line.           Â
In addition all of the above, the Israeli government persists in its
attempts to depict the problem as a conflict over the West Bank and Gaza, rather
than Mandated Palestine, along with creating more illegal settlements and
transferring more illegal settlers. Moreover
there are the Israeli positions that have been raised during the final
settlement negotiations, which effectively destroy the basis of the peace
process, i.e. U.N. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and totally violate
every provision of the resolution. The
situation with regard to these final settlement negotiations cannot be described
as one where there is a big gap between the parties or even that of a huge
disagreement. Rather, it is one in
which the parties do not have a common basis at all since the Israeli side is
intentionally violating the agreed upon basis of the process.           Â
Whether the above described strategy is the final one of the Israeli
government or whether it is the product of other considerations, such as
attempting to further reduce Palestinian expectations, or Barak’s attempts to
keep his broad coalition together with the least possible internal friction, or
even his belief that the time has not yet come to make real progress on the
Palestinian track, remains to be seen. But
one thing is clear. This peace
process cannot continue and peace cannot be achieved while this Israeli strategy
remains the same. It cannot
continue without drastic changes towards compliance with the existing agreements
and, more importantly, compliance with the basis of the peace process, that is
Security Council resolution 242 and the principle of land for peace.           Â
For this to happen, all parties must make their positions known clearly
to the Israeli government. The
U.S., which has special responsibilities in this regard, must do so, as should
Russia, the European Union, and all other important players. The Arab front must be revitalized and the increased effect
of Arab and international pressure must be realized. Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â
Perhaps more important than the above is the need for a clear, detailed,
and firm Palestinian position. It
should be one which is public and on the basis of which negotiations are
conducted with the Israelis and engagement of all other players is achieved. This
position must also be one which adheres to the basis of the process and the
provisions of the existing agreements and, of course, one which insists on the
realization of the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with
international legitimacy, including U.N. resolutions 242, 181 (II), and 194
(III). In this regard, and in
addition to the general position, concrete positions on specific problems, based
on concepts countering prevalent Israeli concepts, are needed. The following should be presented and pursued: Israeli
Settlements: These are illegal and they violate the spirit and
letter of the existing agreements. This
issue must be faced seriously, including the resumption of the Conference of the
High Contracting Parties to the 4th Geneva Convention to adopt
measures for enforcement of the Convention, to ensure full cessation of such
illegal activities. Third Phase of
Israeli Redeployment: This is an important part of the existing agreements
and it must be implemented in total separation from, and prior to, the final
settlement. It should be
substantial, in accordance with the agreements reached, and it should bring an
end to the senseless classification of areas as A, B, C. Â
As such, the classification will revert to a clear differentiation
between areas where Israeli presence has ceased to exist and areas where it is
still in existence. Other
Obligations of the Transitional Period: These should be completed in a speedy manner.Â
This includes the northern safe passage as well as the effective
establishment of the Gaza seaport, in addition of course to the release of
Palestinian prisoners and the return of the displaced persons. The Framework
Agreement: This extraneous idea was added to the Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum as a result of Israeli insistence.Â
The framework agreement should be comprehensive, detailed, and
unambiguous in any of its parts. Failure
to do so should lead to forgoing the idea altogether towards the treaty of the
final settlement. The Time Limit: The main point here is to stress September as the
final deadline for achieving the final settlement. There has been international consensus on this time limit and
it has been accepted by both of the parties.Â
No delay in implementing any provisions of the existing agreement,
including the framework agreement, could or should affect September 2000 as the
agreed-upon and final deadline. Final
Settlement Negotiations: The Palestinian side should not only insist on
implementing resolution 242 and should not only insist on the realization of the
rights of the Palestinian people; it should refuse discussing any Israeli
position that is not in line with the agreed basis of negotiations. Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â
Of all of the above, the two issues where the international dimension
could be of great help are: 1) the resumption of the Conference of the High
Contracting Parties to the 4th Geneva Convention, and 2) in relation
to the time limit, the participation of Palestine as a full Member State of the
United Nations in the work of the Millennium Summit, which will be convened on 6
September 2000. These two issues
along with the other issues mentioned above, when pursued vigorously and
seriously, can make a real difference. Please place the following in a text box: Two issues where the international dimension could be
of great help are: 1) the resumption of the Conference of the High Contracting
Parties to the 4th Geneva Convention, and 2) in relation to the time
limit, the participation of Palestine as a full Member State of the United
Nations in the work of the Millennium Summit  |